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Summary
echnologies available today, and those
expected to become competitive over
the next decade, will permit a rapid
decarbonization of the global energy
economy. New renewable energy technologies,
combined with a broad suite of energy-effi-
ciency advances, will allow global energy needs
to be met without fossil fuels and by adding
only minimally to the cost of energy services.
The world is now in the early stages of an
energy revolution that over the next few decades
could be as momentous as the emergence of oil-
and electricity-based economies a century ago.
Double-digit market growth, annual capital
flows of more than $100 billion, sharp declines
in technology costs, and rapid progress in the
sophistication and effectiveness of government
policies all herald a promising new energy era.
Advanced automotive, electronics, and
buildings systems will allow a substantial
reduction in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions,
at negative costs once the savings in energy
bills is accounted for. The savings from these
measures can effectively pay for a significant
portion of the additional cost of advanced
renewable energy technologies to replace
fossil fuels, including wind, solar, geothermal,
and bioenergy.
Resource estimates indicate that renewable
energy is more abundant than all of the fossil
fuels combined, and that well before mid-cen-
tury it will be possible to run most national
electricity systems with minimal fossil fuels
and only 10 percent of the carbon emissions
they produce today. The development of smart
electricity grids, the integration of plug-in
electric vehicles, and the addition of limited
storage capacity will allow power to be pro-
vided without the baseload plants that are the
foundation of today’s electricity systems.
Recent climate simulations conclude that
CO2 emissions will need to peak within the
next decade and decline by at least 50 to 80
percent by 2050. This challenge will be greatly
complicated by the fact that China, India, and
other developing countries are now rapidly
developing modern energy systems.
The only chance of slowing the buildup of
CO2 concentrations soon enough to avoid cat-
astrophic climate change that could take cen-
turies to reverse is to transform the energy
economies of industrial and developing coun-
tries almost simultaneously. This would have
seemed nearly impossible a few years ago, but
since then, the energy policies and markets of
China and India have begun to change rap-
idly—more rapidly than those in many indus-
trial countries. Renewable and efficiency
technologies will allow developing countries to
increase their reliance on indigenous resources
and reduce their dependence on expensive and
unstable imported fuels.
Around the world, new energy systems
could become a huge engine of industrial
development and job creation, opening vast
new economic opportunities. Developing
countries have the potential to “leapfrog” the
carbon-intensive development path of the 20th
century and go straight to the advanced energy
systems that are possible today.
Improved technology and high energy
prices have created an extraordinarily favorable
market for new energy systems over the past
few years. But reaching a true economic tip-
ping point will require innovative public poli-
cies and strong political leadership.
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The Road to
Low-Carbon Energy
peaking in Washington on June 23,
2008, James Hansen, the top climate
scientist at the U.S. National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration,
had a sharp warning for policymakers: “If we
don’t begin to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions in the next several years, and get on a
very different course, then we are in trouble....
This is the last chance.”1*
After two decades of halting and largely
ineffectual efforts to address the world’s cli-
mate crisis, humanity has reached a moment of
truth. As scientific alarm about the probability
and catastrophic consequences of climate
change has grown in recent years, annual fossil
fuel emissions of the most important green-
house gas, carbon dioxide, have soared 35 per-
cent above their 1990 rates.2 And because we
have waited so long and must now cope with
skyrocketing emissions in China and other
developing countries, the reduction in emis-
sions will need to be steeper, and the challenge
to societies and economies that much greater.
Stabilizing the climate will require changes
in many sectors of the economy, including
agriculture and forestry. But fossil fuels are
the largest part of the problem, and reducing
their dominance of the global energy system is
the key to climate stability. Leading scientists
have concluded that carbon dioxide emissions
from fossil fuels will have to be cut at least 50
to 80 percent below current levels by 2050—
and possibly to zero—in order to prevent
potentially catastrophic rates of climate
change.3 And they will have to continue falling
beyond that date.
To call these targets ambitious is to under-
state the challenge. Carbon-based fossil fuels
made the modern economy and all of its
material accomplishments possible. Powering
the global economy without those fuels will
require restructuring the energy industry
through technological, economic, and policy
innovations that are as all-encompassing as
the climate change they must address. A
large-scale shift to carbon-free sources of
energy is the essential centerpiece of such a
transformation, together with major advances
in energy efficiency.
The question of whether such a transition is
possible is one of the most complex and hotly
debated issues of our time. Many experts, par-
ticularly those employed by today’s energy
industries, believe that fossil fuels must remain
dominant for decades to come, and that the
only viable energy strategy relies on even more
massive use of coal, coupled with development
of a vast system to capture and store the result-
ing carbon dioxide. But since the 1970s, a small
but growing tribe of energy dissidents has
argued that there is another option: that the
solution to our carbon problem is not at the
“end-of-the-pipe” but in an entirely new
energy system. Today, such a transition appears
more feasible—and more imminent—than
ever before.
The technologies that are available today, or
are projected to become available over the next
two decades, will allow a rapid shift in the mix
of energy sources on which the world
depends—and equally dramatic changes in the
systems for transporting, storing, and using
that energy. Solar, wind, geothermal, and bio-
logical resources each have the potential to
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supply vast quantities of energy that can be
converted to electricity and liquid and gaseous
fuels, as well as used to supply heat directly to
buildings and industry. But new technologies
will need to be complemented by major
changes in the world’s energy infrastructure
and by far more efficient use of energy than
ever before.
At a time when genes can be engineered and
spacecraft sent to Mars, shifting to a new
energy system is hardly an impossible task. But
it will require mobilizing substantial resources,
which in turn will depend on major policy
changes that overcome the decades of subsidies
and structural impediments that prop up the
current energy system. Nor will it be inexpen-
sive, likely costing several trillion dollars by the
time the transition is complete.4* While most
of that investment will come from funds that
otherwise would have gone to additional devel-
opment of fossil fuels, upfront costs will be
greater and the price of energy may be some-
what higher in the short term. But if a new
commitment to renewable sources of energy is
accompanied by a matching commitment to
improved efficiency, energy needs will be
smaller and the bills paid by individuals and
businesses could well be lower than they would
be if we remained addicted to fossil fuels.
To many people, such a transformation
remains unimaginable. For nearly a century—
since the times of Thomas Edison and Henry
Ford—energy has been a relatively static busi-
ness, characterized by slow, incremental
change, limited competition, and some of the
lowest rates of research and development of
any major industry. But that is now changing.
Concern about climate change and rising
energy prices have sparked a nascent transfor-
mation of the energy business, with engineers,
entrepreneurs, and investors who would have
been focused on the Internet and biotechnol-
ogy a decade ago now focused on energy. Their
skills, energy, and commitment to solving one
of the world’s greatest problems is likely to
prove as revolutionary as their great-grandpar-
ents’ work to build a carbon-based economy a
century ago.
Rebuilding the global energy system will be
expensive, but it can also be transformative.
And its sheer scale would create thousands of
new businesses and millions of jobs for
decades to come. At a time of serious eco-
nomic troubles, volatile oil prices, and instabil-
ity in many fossil fuel producing regions,
building an efficient, low-carbon energy sys-
tem can become an engine of economic recov-
ery, job creation, and international
cooperation. Climate change, energy security,
and economic development should be viewed,
in the words of Common Cause founder John
Gardner, as “breathtaking opportunities dis-
guised as insoluble problems.”5
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Darling National
Wind Farm in Cape
Town, South Africa.
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Avoiding Catastrophe
ver the past half-million years,
the world’s climate has seen four
ice ages and four warm periods
separating them. Over that vast
sweep of time, extensive glaciers have engulfed
large swaths of North America, Europe, and
Asia and then retreated; thousands of species
were displaced, and the shapes of coastlines
were rearranged as sea levels rose and fell. Yet
throughout these hundreds of thousands of
years, the atmospheric concentration of car-
bon dioxide (CO2), which plays a key role in
regulating the climate, has never risen above
300 parts per million.1
In 2007, the atmospheric concentration of
CO2 passed 384 parts per million (see Figure
1), and it is already at the equivalent of 430
parts per million if the effect of other green-
house gases is included.2 Humanity is at risk of
creating a climate unlike any it has seen before,
unfolding at an unnatural, accelerated pace—
more dramatic than any changes in the climate
since Earth was last struck by a large asteroid
nearly a million years ago. Unless greenhouse
gas emissions begin to decline within the next
decade, we risk triggering a runaway disrup-
tion of the world’s climate—one that could last
centuries and that our descendants would be
powerless to stop.
Only recently have scientists understood
that changes in the concentration of CO2,
methane, and other less common greenhouse
gases could trigger an ecological catastrophe of
staggering proportions. The climate, it turns
out, is not the vast, implacable system it
appears to be.
Past climate changes have been caused by
tiny alterations in the Earth’s orbit and orien-
tation to the sun—providing, for example, just
enough added energy to warm the planet over
thousands of years, increasing the concentra-
tion of CO2 in the atmosphere, and in turn
triggering even larger changes in the tempera-
ture, which scientists call a positive feedback.
Today’s massive release of CO2 and other
greenhouse gases is leading to far greater
changes to the atmosphere in a period of
decades.3 According to scientist James Hansen,
“More warming is already in the pipeline,
delayed only by the great inertia of the world’s
oceans. And the climate is nearing dangerous
tipping points. Elements of a perfect storm, a
global cataclysm, are now assembled.”4
Scientists project that in the decades imme-
diately ahead, the capacity of the Earth and its
oceans to absorb carbon emissions will decline,
while vast changes in the world’s ecosystems
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Figure 1. Atmospheric Concentration of Carbon Dioxide,
1744–2007
may further accelerate warming. Recent studies
show that frozen soils in the Arctic contain vast
quantities of carbon—60 percent more than
was previously estimated and equivalent to
one-sixth of the carbon now in the atmos-
phere.5 Melting tundra could release millions
of tons of carbon dioxide as well as methane—
a greenhouse gas 25 times more powerful than
CO2—causing additional warming.6*
Another tipping point may lie in the Arctic
Ocean, where the year-round ice cap has been
shrinking dramatically and unexpectedly in
recent years, and may disappear entirely in the
summer months within the next decade. This
will cause an enormous change in the Earth’s
energy balance, with more of the sun’s light
and heat being absorbed, raising temperatures
further in the northern hemisphere.7 This
could mean the end of the million-year-old
Greenland ice sheet, which by itself contains
enough water to raise worldwide sea levels by
more than seven meters.8
Exactly when the world will reach such a
tipping point—or whether it already has—is
not known. But it is clear that ecological
change of this magnitude would lead to
unprecedented disruptions to the world’s
economies. A groundbreaking 2006 study led
by former World Bank chief economist
Nicholas Stern concluded that climate change
could cut global economic output by between
5 and 20 percent.9 And in his 2007 book, The
Age of Turbulence, Alan Greenspan, the leading
free-market economist of the day, included cli-
mate change as one of five forces that could
derail the U.S. economy in the 21st century.10
The uneven and disruptive nature of these
changes could set off additional crises as con-
flict both within and between societies under-
mines their stability.
In 2007, the combustion of fossil fuels
released nearly 30 billion tons of carbon diox-
ide to the atmosphere—more than a million
tons every hour—with coal and oil contribut-
ing roughly 40 percent each and natural gas
accounting for the rest.11 The manufacture of
cement released nearly another 350 million
tons, while deforestation and agriculture com-
bined contributed roughly 1.6 billion tons.12
Annual fossil-fuel carbon emissions have
increased fivefold since 1950 and the rate of
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*Units of measure throughout this report are metric
unless common usage dictates otherwise.
Sea ice clogs the gap
between iceberg B-
15A, right, and B-15J,
left, on October 21,
2003. B15 was the
world’s largest
recorded iceberg
until it broke up
after calving from
Antarctica's Ross Ice
Shelf in March 2000.
Brien Barnett, National Science
Foundation
increase has actually accelerated since 2002.13
Today, fossil fuels provide four-fifths of the
energy that powers the global economy.14
Burning fossil fuels on this scale is a vast
and risky experiment with the Earth’s bios-
phere. The United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, adopted in 1992,
commits nations around the globe to prevent-
ing dangerous climate change. Precisely identi-
fying that point is difficult, but the 2007 report
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) as well as more recent assess-
ments by James Hansen andW.L. Hare of the
Potsdam Institute suggest that the increase in
the global temperature must not exceed 1.5 to
2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.15
(The increase so far is just under 0.8 degrees
Celsius, with some additional increase locked
in as the greenhouse gases already in the
atmosphere have their full impact.16) This
requires preventing the atmospheric concen-
tration of CO2 from exceeding 450 parts per
million and a long-run goal of returning the
concentration to 350 ppm—below the current
level.17
The bottom line is clear: to keep the world’s
climate within the range it has occupied for at
least a million years, recent emission trends
will need to be quickly reversed. The current
emissions trajectory would take the atmos-
pheric concentration to 650 ppm or beyond
by the end of the century. The scenarios pub-
lished in the 2007 IPCC report indicate that in
order to stabilize the climate, global green-
house gas emissions must peak before 2020
and be reduced by 40–70 percent by 2050,
eventually falling to zero.18 The goal of reduc-
ing global emissions by half by 2050 has been
adopted by the European Union and was
endorsed by industrial country leaders at the
G8 Economic Summit in Japan, giving it polit-
ical as well as economic significance.19 How
rapidly carbon dioxide emissions need to fall
during this period depends on how quickly
emissions of the other key gases are reduced;
recent estimates range from a 50-percent
reduction to eliminating CO2 emissions
entirely by mid-century.20
The magnitude of the challenge is obvious
when the emissions path needed to avoid cata-
strophic climate change is compared with the
current trajectory.21 (See Table 1.) The U.S.
Department of Energy forecasts that both
world energy use and carbon emissions will
grow nearly 50 percent by 2030—an average
rate of 1.7 percent per year.22 This would take
emissions to more than 40 billion tons in 2030
and, assuming continued growth at that rate,
to 62 billion tons in 2050—nearly four times
the annual emissions that would be needed to
keep the peak CO2 concentration below 450
parts per million.23
The challenge is made particularly difficult
by the fact that the energy needs of developing
countries such as India and China have accel-
erated in recent years as they have entered the
most energy-intensive stages of their develop-
ment, building industries and infrastructure at
an astonishing pace. In 2006, industrial coun-
tries, with less than 20 percent of the world’s
population, contributed roughly 40 percent of
global emissions, and they are responsible for
more than 60 percent of the total CO2 that fos-
sil fuel combustion has added to the atmos-
phere since the Industrial Revolution began in
the early 19th century.24 But this picture is
changing rapidly, particularly in China, where
since 2002, emissions growth has accelerated to
a remarkable 10 percent annual rate.25
As recently as 2004, China was not expected
to pass the United States in CO2 emissions
until 2030; however, data now indicate that this
threshold was crossed in 2007 if cement-
related emissions are included.26 China barely
trailed the United States in emissions from fos-
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Table 1. Global Energy Use and Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 2007
and Two Scenarios for 2050
2050 2050
Business Stabilization
Indicator 2007 as Usual Scenario
CO2 concentration (parts per million) 384 ~550 <450
Population (billion) 6.7 9.2 9.2
Energy use (billion tons oil equivalent) 12.0 23 16
Energy-related CO2 emissions (billion tons) 29.9 62 15
Source: See Endnote 21 for this section.
sil fuels in 2007, and the two together account
for fully 40 percent of global emissions.27 (See
Table 2.) Emissions are also growing quickly in
other parts of the developing world, particu-
larly elsewhere in Asia and in the Middle East,
where rapid population growth, rising oil
wealth, and low, subsidized energy prices have
led to skyrocketing energy demand.28
Providing energy services for the much
larger global economy of 2050 while reducing
CO2 emissions to 15 billion tons will require
an energy system that is very different from
today’s.29 For the world as a whole to reduce its
emissions by at least half by 2050, today’s
industrial countries will need to cut theirs by
more than 80 percent.30 According to most
official assessments, including that of the
IPCC, getting there depends on some combi-
nation of a three-pronged strategy: reducing
energy consumption through new technologies
and lifestyles, shifting to carbon-free energy
technologies, and capturing and storing the
CO2 released when fossil fuels are combusted.
A variety of combinations of these three
options can in theory do the job.31 It is now
time to develop a coherent strategy—and to
shape policy and investment accordingly.
Emissions from oil will be limited by supply
constraints. Production of conventional crude
oil is expected to peak and begin declining
within the next decade or two.32 By 2050, out-
put could be a third or more below the current
level.33 This will require that transportation
fleets shift rapidly to other energy options, the
most promising of which are electricity (pro-
duced from renewable energy), advanced bio-
fuels, and compressed natural gas. Reliance on
natural gas, which has not been as heavily
exploited as oil and which releases half as
much carbon per unit of energy as coal, is
likely to grow. But its potential to be used effi-
ciently for cogeneration of heat and power will
limit its contribution to emissions.
Unfortunately, the slowdown in the rate of
discovery of oil and gas is pushing world
energy markets toward dirtier, more carbon-
intensive fossil fuels. The greatest problem for
the world’s climate is coal, which is both more
abundant and more carbon-intensive than oil,
and the “unconventional” fossil fuels such as
tar sands and oil shale, which at recent oil
prices have become economically viable.
Unless the development of these dirty fossil
fuels is deliberately curtailed in favor of renew-
able alternatives, it will be imposible to reach
the declining emission trajectories that scien-
tists say are needed.
Coal-fired power plants currently supply
more than 40 percent of the world’s electricity,
and their large contribution to CO2 emissions
has led policymakers and industrialists to focus
on carbon capture and storage (CCS) so that
those plants can be compatible with a low-car-
bon economy.34 Such plants would be
equipped with devices that capture carbon
either before or after the combustion of fossil
fuels, and then pipe the CO2 into underground
geological reservoirs or into the deep ocean,
where it could in principle remain for millions
of years.
Coal can either be gasified (as it already is in
some advanced power plants), with the carbon
dioxide then separated from the other gases, or
it can be burned directly in a super-critical
pulverized plant that also allows the capture of
as much as 90 percent of the CO2. Four CCS
projects are in operation in Algeria, Canada,
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Table 2. Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions, Selected
Countries, 1990 and 2007
CO2 Emissions, CO2 Emissions,
CO2 Emissions Per Capita Per $ GDP
Country or Region 1990 2007 1990 2007 1990 2007
(kilograms per
(billion tons) (tons) $1,000 GDP (PPP))
United States 4.8 6.1 18.7 19.2 823 437
China 2.3 5.9 2.0 4.4 2,523 844
European Union-27 3.6 3.8 7.6 7.6 514 258
India 0.6 1.5 0.8 1.2 898 503
Japan 1.0 1.2 8.3 9.7 446 290
Africa 0.6 1.2 1.0 1.2 864 595
Others 9.0 10.2 – – – –
World 22.0 29.9 4.2 4.3 863 460
* Does not include emissions resulting from gas flaring, cement making, or land use
change.
Source: See Endnote 27 for this section.
Germany, and Norway.35 The facilities in Alge-
ria and Norway simply capture carbon dioxide
that is extracted together with natural gas. The
small project in Weyburn, Canada, on the
other hand, gasifies coal, extracting CO2 and
injecting it underground.While these tech-
nologies are advancing, together with advances
in modeling and monitoring of geological
sites, full-scale commercial CCS systems are
still a long way off. And a vast physical infra-
structure will be needed to capture, move, and
store the emissions from even a fraction of
today's fossil fuel combustion.
The United States, European Union, Japan,
and China have all launched government-
funded CCS programs in the last few years, but
the pace of these efforts is surprisingly lethar-
gic given the urgency of the climate problem
and the fact that much of the power industry is
counting on CCS to allow them to continue
burning massive amounts of coal. A 2007 study
by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
concluded that the U.S. Department of
Energy’s main program to demonstrate the
feasibility of large-scale CCS is not on track to
achieve rapid commercialization of key tech-
nologies.37 Locating, testing, and licensing
large-scale reservoirs where CO2 can be stored
is a particularly urgent task. Also problematic
is the fact that CCS will be water- and energy-
intensive, which will limit its attractiveness in
many regions.
It will take at least a decade to develop and
test large-scale CCS technology, which means
that it will be the 2020s or 2030s at the earliest
before significant numbers of low-carbon coal
plants can begin to be built. How large a role
CCS ultimately plays in a low-carbon economy
will depend on how rapidly the technology
develops, how much it costs, and whether gov-
ernments and industries are able to success-
fully mobilize the massive infrastructure
investment that will be required. In the mean-
time, James Hansen and Al Gore have both
called for a moratorium on building new coal-
fired power plants until CCS can be included.
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A Convenient Truth
n 2001, as U.S. Vice President Dick
Cheney was assembling the Bush Admin-
istration’s energy policy proposals, he
described saving energy as a “moral virtue”
not worthy of serious consideration alongside
more robust energy options such as offshore
oil drilling and nuclear power.1 Cheney’s quick
dismissal of the demand-side approach to
meeting energy needs reflects a widespread
neglect of efficiency by policymakers and
investors since energy prices fell dramatically
in the 1980s.
But as energy prices recently reached all-
time highs, the consensus of expert opinion
has shifted decisively. Reducing the amount of
energy wasted and increasing the amount of
economic output that can be produced with a
given amount of energy is now considered the
most economical way of reducing dependence
on fossil fuels. The monetary savings associ-
ated with boosting energy productivity are
often sufficient to justify the investment even if
the world were not facing a climate crisis.
Given the urgency of the climate problem, that
is indeed a convenient truth.
Energy productivity measures an economy’s
ability to extract useful services from the
energy that is harnessed. From the earliest
stages of the Industrial Revolution, energy pro-
ductivity has advanced steadily, a trend that
accelerated dramatically when energy prices
soared in the 1970s. In the United States, the
economy has grown 165 percent since 1973,
while energy use rose just 34 percent, allowing
the nation’s energy productivity to double dur-
ing the period.2 Germany and Japan, starting
with higher productivity levels, have achieved
comparable increases.3 But even today, well
over half of the energy harnessed worldwide is
converted to waste heat rather than being used
to meet energy needs.4
This suggests enormous potential to
improve energy productivity in the decades
ahead, and broader trends will boost that
effort. Many technologies are becoming more
and more efficient—from steelmaking to auto-
mobiles—and in
recent decades, the
economies of most
industrial countries
have centered the bulk
of their economic
growth on light
industry and the serv-
ice sector, with
energy-intensive
industries such as
smelting metals and
manufacturing petro-
chemicals falling as a
share of the total
economy. Even larger
opportunities are
found in developing
nations, where energy
productivity tends to
be lower and much of
the basic infrastruc-
ture is still being built.
However, this poten-
tial will be offset in some countries in the short
term by the fact that they are entering an infra-
structure- and energy-intensive stage of eco-
nomic development.
In China, for example, energy growth sud-
denly accelerated in 2002—with the bulk of
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the growth coming from energy-intensive
industries needed to build the factories, roads,
buildings, and other pillars of an industrial
economy.5 This abruptly ended two decades of
impressive energy productivity gains in which
China’s energy use and emissions had grown
much slower than the economy as a whole. As
a result, China’s CO2 emissions nearly doubled
between 2002 and 2007, passing the United
States (if cement emissions are included) two
decades before the International Energy
Agency had projected this would occur.6
The dramatic acceleration of energy growth
in China has alarmed the country’s leaders,
who are concerned about the economic, secu-
rity, and environmental implications of soar-
ing energy demand. The country’s 11th
Five-Year Plan, adopted in 2006, calls for a 4
percent annual increase in the country’s energy
productivity; new efficiency standards have
been adopted and energy subsidies reduced.7
With the right policies in place, rapid eco-
nomic growth can speed the introduction of a
new generation of efficient electric motors, air
conditioners, automobiles, power plants, com-
puters, aircraft, and buildings.
Light bulbs are a case in point. Compact
fluorescent lamps (CFLs), first developed in
the early 1980s, have been catching on as an
alternative to the incandescent bulb introduced
to the mass market by Thomas Edison in the
late 19th century. CFLs represent a remarkable
advance in energy efficiency—producing
nearly four times as much light for each watt
of power consumed.8 Until recently, CFLs were
expensive and did not meet the needs of many
lighting applications, but two decades of
miniaturization of components, improvements
in the quality of light produced, and reduc-
tions in manufacturing costs have largely
closed the gap with incandescents, and sales
are soaring.9
Although CFL technology was developed in
the United States and has been dominated by
European and U.S. firms, most of the bulbs are
now manufactured in China where they have
become nearly ubiquitous. Chinese production
of CFLs tripled from 750 million units in 2001
to 2.4 billion in 2006.10 In the United States,
sales rose from 21 million units in 2000 to 397
million in 2007.11 The CFL share of the light-
ing market varies widely, from 80 percent in
Japan, to 50 percent in Germany, to 20 percent
in the United States.12 Around the world, the
use of CFLs will continue to rise as govern-
ments implement lighting efficiency standards
that promote their use and in some cases virtu-
ally prohibit the sale of incandescent bulbs.
In the meantime, several other new lighting
technologies are under development, including
a semi-conductor device known as a light-
emitting diode (LED) that is as much as 90
percent more efficient than an incandescent.
Currently deployed for a range of specialized
forms of lighting, including stoplights and
electronic devices, LEDs are still too expensive
for widespread use. However, costs are falling,
and engineers are developing a range of new
LEDs that will have much wider application.
The greatest potential for energy savings lies
in the most basic element of the energy econ-
omy—buildings—which consume about 40
percent of global energy and emit a compara-
ble share of CO2 emissions.13 About half of
this energy use is for space and water heating,
and the rest is associated with the production
of electricity for lighting, space cooling, and
powering appliances and office equipment.14
With technologies available today, such as bet-
ter insulation, more-efficient lighting and
appliances, improved doors and windows, and
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heat recovery ventilators, the fossil energy
needs of buildings can be reduced by 70 per-
cent or more, with the additional investment
paid for via lower energy bills.15 Further gains
can be achieved by designing and orienting
buildings so that they can benefit from natural
heating, cooling, and daylighting.
The advent of cheap energy enabled mod-
ern buildings to work in spite of nature rather
than with it. But it is possible to reduce
demand in existing buildings by insulating
them appropriately, controlling unwanted air
infiltration, and improving performance for
space and water heating, lighting, ventilation,
and air conditioning. There is a substantial gap
between economic potential and commercial
reality in the buildings sector, and since the
1970s, national, state, and local governments
have imposed energy building codes to close
that gap. But in recent years, those codes have
themselves fallen short of driving the kind of
advances that are possible.
Studies show that for new construction, the
integration of design with multiple energy-
efficiency measures can reduce energy use to
half or less that of a comparable conventional
building, as new offices from New York City to
London to Berlin have demonstrated.16 Poten-
tial savings in India, China, and elsewhere
could be even greater. India, for example, has
no mandatory efficiency codes for commercial
buildings, and most building contractors have
not been trained to install insulation.17 But
greener buildings are on the way in India as
well. One of the largest green commercial
developments in the world is under construc-
tion outside of Delhi; it is expected to exceed
international energy performance standards.18
“Green buildings” that minimize the use of
energy as well as other environmental impacts
have attracted growing attention around the
globe in recent years. In the United States,
green certification is now highly sought by
builders of new commercial buildings, setting
off a wave of advances by architects, engineers,
and builders. The U.S. Green Building Council,
which developed a popular set of voluntary
standards, now includes more than 15,000
member organizations.19 Efforts are under way
to strengthen the energy efficiency require-
ments within these standards. Canada, India,
and other nations are meanwhile developing
their own standards.
European countries are moving particularly
rapidly and with greater government support,
sparking a green building boom. The Pas-
sivhaus Institute in Germany, which began
developing criteria for highly efficient houses
in 1990, has built more than 6,000 living and
commercial units that consume about one-
tenth the energy of standard German homes.20
In China, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-
Rural Development has established a goal of
making new city buildings 65 percent more
efficient than existing buildings are, and the
State Council has established a tax and feebate
system for energy hookups that encourages
better efficiency.21
As peak energy loads for lighting, heating,
and cooling decline, so does the required size
of fans, boilers, and other equipment, provid-
ing additional savings. The modest remaining
energy needs can be met with renewable
energy. In 2008, the European Parliament
called for “all new buildings needing to be
heated and/or cooled be constructed to passive
house or equivalent non-residential standards
from 2011 onwards, and a requirement to use
passive heating and cooling solutions from
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2008.”22 This goal is awaiting implementing
laws in member states.
As energy efficiency improves, each unit of
energy is cheaper, so consumers may choose to
use more energy or to spend this savings on
additional goods that require energy. The
resulting rebound effect is measured by the dif-
ference between projected and actual energy
savings that result from an increase in effi-
ciency.23 This can be countered with progres-
sively stronger efficiency standards or with
technology advances that offer the potential to
break the mold. Case studies in the United
States have concluded that energy savings in
energy-efficient commercial buildings—from
schools to office towers—have frequently been
greater than projected.24
Even greater savings can come from “zero-
energy” or “zero-carbon” buildings that pro-
duce all of their energy on site with renewable
energy, emitting no CO2. (Most buildings will
need to have an energy supply from outside to
meet peak demands at particular times of the
day and year, but are considered zero net
energy if they produce as much energy as they
consume over the course of a year.) The United
Kingdom has mandated that all new homes
built after 2016 and all commercial buildings
built after 2019 be zero-carbon.25
In developing countries, energy use in
buildings is growing particularly rapidly as
people move into improved homes and acquire
amenities such as heating, cooling, and refrig-
eration. In China, buildings already account
for 23 percent of energy use, and with 300
million people—equivalent to the entire U.S.
population—expected to move to cities in the
next decade, the largest construction boom in
history will unfold in the coming years.26
How these buildings are constructed will pro-
foundly shape CO2 emissions in China for
decades to come.
Another large opportunity for advancing
energy productivity can be found in the exten-
sive use of combined heat and power (CHP),
also known as cogeneration. In most power
plants today, two-thirds of the energy con-
tained in the plant’s fuel is converted into
waste heat or lost in the transmission
process.27 In the United States, the waste heat
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from power plants is equivalent to all of the
energy consumed in Japan.28 By integrating
power generation with factories and buildings,
high-temperature waste heat can be used to
produce electricity, or, in another configura-
tion, the waste heat from power generation can
be used for industrial and building heat,
increasing total energy efficiency from 33 per-
cent to as high as 80–90 percent.29
Some of the world’s first power plants
employed CHP, and while it has since fallen
out of favor in most nations, some have pur-
sued it aggressively since the early 1980s. Fin-
land and Denmark obtain 40 and 50 percent
respectively of their electricity from CHP, far
above the levels found in countries such as the
United States (8 percent) and Germany and
China (12 percent each).30
It is estimated that CHP in Europe reduced
annual CO2 emissions by 57 million tons
between 1990 and 2005, accounting for 15 per-
cent of European emissions reductions.31 If
most industrial countries were to aggressively
pursue CHP, it would eliminate the need for
new coal plants and allow many older plants to
be gradually shut down. At today’s energy
prices, much of the investment can be justified
in energy savings alone. The United States
could get 150 gigawatts, or 15 percent of its
power, from the unused waste heat from heavy
industry as well as from manure, food industry
waste, landfill gas, wastewater, steam, gas
pipeline pressure differentials, fuel pipeline
leakages, and flaring. This is as much power as
the entire U.S. nuclear industry produces.32
A global assessment by the McKinsey Global
Institute of the potential to improve energy
productivity concluded that the rate of annual
improvement between now and 2020 could be
increased from 1 percent to 2 percent, which
would slow the rate of global energy demand
growth to just 1 percent a year.33 If these gains
are extended to 2050, the growth in world
energy use could be held to roughly 50 percent
above current levels, rather than the doubling
that is projected under most business-as-usual
scenarios. This large difference is equivalent to
the combined current energy consumption of
the European Union, Japan, and North Amer-
ica.34 By fully exploiting all of the opportuni-
ties described above, the world could likely do
even better than that.
Future increases in energy productivity
will not only reduce consumption of fossil
fuels, they will make it easier and more afford-
able to rapidly increase the use of carbon-free
energy. And additional gains can be made by
altering the design of cities—for example, by
increasing the role of public transport, walk-
ing, and cycling while reducing dependence
on automobiles.
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No-Carbon Energy
o matter how efficiently energy
is used, substantial reductions in
carbon dioxide emissions will
require the simultaneous and
rapid introduction of carbon-free sources of
energy. One option that is gaining increased
attention these days is nuclear power, which
already plays a major role in some countries
but faces considerable obstacles to its expan-
sion in the decades ahead.1 (See Sidebar 1.)
The more robust carbon-free energy option is
renewable energy, including solar, wind, bio-
mass, and geothermal energy. In the longer
run, ocean energy—from tides, waves, cur-
rents, and thermal convection—is another
strong possibility.
Assessments of the potential of renewable
energy to replace fossil fuels over the next few
decades vary widely, with skepticism running
high among many energy executives. The
World Energy Council, which represents the
large energy companies that dominate today’s
energy economy, declared in 2007 that renew-
able energy has “enormous practical challenges.
It is unlikely to deliver a significant decarboni-
sation of electricity quickly enough to meet the
climate challenge.”2 That view is outdated and
inaccurate: rapidly advancing technologies are
making a growing number of renewable energy
options economically competitive in today’s
markets, and the pace of progress continues to
accelerate. This, combined with the vast scale
of the renewable energy resource base, holds
the potential for what can only be described as
an energy revolution.
Modern renewable energy technologies have
been advancing steadily since the late 1970s,
with modest government support and indus-
tries that were concentrated in a handful of
countries. But in the past five years, renewable
energy has entered a super-charged stage of
growth. Soaring energy prices combined with
new government policies and concern about
climate change have spurred a growing army of
small and mid-sized companies and a wide
range of investors who are pouring tens of bil-
lions of dollars into an array of promising
renewables technologies.3
Coal-fired power plants generate 40 percent
of the world’s electricity and account for a
third of global CO2 emissions.4 Replacing
existing plants—and those being planned—
with renewable power would make a big dent
in the world’s climate problem.5 Renewable
energy sources already supply nearly one-fifth
of the world’s electricity. While most of this
comes from large hydropower, which is grow-
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Figure 2. Average Annual Growth Rates by Energy Source,
2002–07
ing very slowly, wind capacity is expanding at
24 percent per year and solar at over 40 per-
cent, rivaling the computer and mobile phone
industries.7 (See Figure 2.)
Since 2000, wind power has gone from a
tiny niche electricity supplier to become a sig-
nificant force in the global power business.
Deploying giant multi-megawatt wind tur-
bines made by companies such as General
Electric, Siemens, Vestas, and Gamesa, the
wind industry is now booming.8 Total generat-
ing capacity is estimated to have passed 100
gigawatts in early 2008, double the amount in
2004.9 An industry that was dominated by Cal-
ifornia and Denmark in the 1980s, and by Ger-
many and Spain in the 1990s, is now
flourishing in the world’s largest power mar-
kets, including China, India, the United States,
and the European Union.
In 2007, wind power represented 40 percent
of new generating capacity installations in
Europe and 35 percent in the United States.10
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Sidebar 1. What About Nuclear Power?
Nuclear power is a largely carbon-free energy source that could in theory help phase out fossil fuels. At the beginning of 2008,
there were 372 gigawatts (GW) of nuclear generating capacity, providing roughly 15 percent of the world’s electricity. But nuclear
power has been plagued by a range of problems, from safety concerns, to radioactive waste disposal, to the diversion of tech-
nologies and fuel for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear construction starts peaked in the 1970s with an average of 25 GW annually, falling to an average of less than 5 GW in
the last five years. Over the past decade, global nuclear capacity has expanded at a rate of less than 1 percent a year. In 2006 and
2007, the world added 3 GW of nuclear capacity, compared with 35 GW of wind capacity over the same two-year period. By the
end of 2007, some 34 reactors were being built worldwide, but 12 of these units have been “under construction” for 20 years or
more. In Western Europe, only Finland and France are building nuclear plants. In the United States, one problem-plagued plant
is being built; it has now been under construction for more than a quarter century.
The combination of concern about climate change, high natural gas prices, and a large dose of new government subsidies has
recently revived interest in nuclear power. Several companies are developing modestly revamped plant designs that are intended
to make nuclear plants easier to control, less prone to accidents, and cheaper to build. The most important innovations are to
standardize designs and streamline regulatory procedures. So far, two of the newer nuclear plants are being built in Europe, and
several are under construction in China. In the United States, 23 applications have been filed for construction and operating
licenses since 2004; however, only four of these include actual plant designs, and all are dependent on federal loan guarantees.
The $18.5 billion that Congress has so far made available for loan guarantees is only enough to support two plants.
The largest hurdle facing the nuclear industry is the one that crushed it in the 1980s: economics. In the United States, it is
now estimated that nuclear plants cost twice as much as a coal plant to build and five times what a natural gas plant costs. A
study by a Keystone Center panel composed of academics, energy analysts, and industry representatives estimated the full cost
of new nuclear power at 8–11 cents per kilowatt-hour, which is more than coal, natural gas, biomass, and wind-powered genera-
tors. For nuclear power to be economical, the industry will need to build large numbers of standardized plants, but new orders
are coming sporadically, and utilities are pursuing an array of new designs, which is likely to keep costs stubbornly high. And
because of the large capital requirements and long lead times, nuclear plants face a risk premium that other generators do not—
a risk that will be exacerbated by tight financial conditions in the years ahead. In Finland, ground was broken in 2005 on the first
new European reactor in a decade; three years later, it is two years behind schedule and $2 billion over budget.
Energy planners will also have to reckon with the scale and pace of construction that would be needed to make a serious dent
in the world’s climate problem. MIT researchers estimate that 1,000–1,500 new reactors would be needed by 2050 for nuclear to
play a meaningful role in reducing global emissions—a construction pace 20 times that of the past decade and five times the
peak level in the 1980s. Speed, however, is not one of nuclear power’s virtues. Planning, licensing, and constructing a single
nuclear plant typically takes 10–15 years, and completion deadlines are frequently missed. Due to the dearth of orders in recent
decades, the world currently has limited capacity to manufacture many critical nuclear components. Rebuilding that capacity will
take a decade or more. In the United States, it is estimated that it will be 2012 at the earliest before a construction license is
approved, and that the first plant will not begin operating until 2020 or beyond. By the time a significant number of plants come
on line in the late 2020s or early 2030s, they will largely be replacing today’s plants, which will by then be ready for retirement.
Source: See Endnote 1 for this section.
Further growth will come from offshore wind
farms, which are expected to expand rapidly in
the coming decade. And this torrid growth
appears likely to continue as more and more
governments follow the leaders and implement
wind-friendly electricity laws. As the industry
grows, it invests in ever more efficient wind
technologies, driving costs down. In the United
States, wind power now costs just under six
cents per kilowatt-hour on average—less than
natural gas and roughly even with coal.11 (See
Figure 3.)
The solar industry is starting from a smaller
base but is growing even more rapidly than
wind power. Annual production of solar cells
(semiconductors that turn sunlight into elec-
tricity) rose 41 percent in 2006 and 51 percent
in 2007.12 Cumulative installations of solar
cells have grown more than fivefold over the
past five years, spurred by strong incentive pro-
grams in Germany, Japan, and Spain.13 This
growth has fueled a powerful wave of innova-
tion in a technology that was invented only in
the 1950s. From Silicon Valley, California, to
Munich, Germany, and Shenzen, China, scores
of companies are pursuing an extraordinary
array of approaches to improving solar cell
design and lowering costs.
Solar power still requires significant subsi-
dies, but the Prometheus Institute projected in
2007 that as the industry scales up, installed
system prices for large projects will fall 50 per-
cent by 2010, to $4 per watt (without incen-
tives) in the best locations.14 Solar cells are
deployed mainly on rooftops where they pro-
vide power for homes, businesses, and public
institutions, with excess power fed into the
local grid. In regions such as California and
Italy that combine high electricity prices and
ample sunshine, solar power is expected to fall
to less than 25 cents per kilowatt-hour, becom-
ing cost-competitive with the retail price of
electricity within the next three years.15
Even as solar cells enter the mainstream,
attention has focused on using solar thermal
energy through large concentrating solar
power (CSP) plants. Built mainly in deserts,
these plants provide wholesale electricity that is
transmitted to cities and industries via high-
voltage power grids, in the same way most
power is today. A wide range of CSP plant
designs are being pursued; most rely on mir-
rored parabolic troughs or dishes to concen-
trate the sun’s heat, which is then transferred to
water or another fluid, with the resulting steam
used to spin a turbine and produce electricity.
These plants produce power in much the way
that conventional coal or nuclear plants do, but
they operate at lower temperatures and pres-
sures, which permits cost reduction.
The world’s first modern CSP plant was
built in California’s Mojave Desert in the late
1980s, but it was not until the past few years
that the technology experienced a dramatic
renaissance.16 More than a dozen projects with
a combined capacity of over 4 GW are under
contract in the southwestern United States
alone, and another 3 GW in other countries
including Spain, China, Egypt, and Israel.17
Costs are still relatively high at 10 cents or
more per kilowatt-hour, but because the indus-
try is in the early part of a very steep learning
curve, costs are expected to fall rapidly in the
next 5–10 years. New plant designs continue to
emerge, including a Pacific Gas and Electric
project that will use 800 megawatts of solar
cells rather than thermal systems.18
Geothermal energy—heat from deep in the
Earth’s crust—is another large potential source
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Figure 3. Cost of Electricity Generation by Source
of electricity. Geothermal power currently pro-
vides just 10 GW of power worldwide, with
much of it in the United States, the Philip-
pines, and Mexico.19 But a new generation of
enhanced geothermal technologies is now
being developed that makes it possible to tap a
much larger geothermal resource base.
Advanced geological sensing and drilling tech-
niques developed by the oil industry are being
combined with new heat exchanger materials
and systems. By piping water into porous geo-
logical structures 1 to 10 kilometers beneath
the Earth’s surface and then bringing the
heated water back to a plant at the surface,
electricity can be generated. The Massachusetts
Institute of Technology has estimated that the
United States alone has at least 100 GW of
geothermal potential, mainly in the western
states, and similar potential undoubtedly exists
in many other countries.20
As renewable energy technologies have
advanced, attention has turned to the adequacy
of the resource base available to meet the large
and growing demands of the global economy.
Many are skeptical that these relatively dis-
persed and often variable energy sources can
meet such vast energy needs. They need not be
worried. The sunlight alone that strikes the
Earth’s land surface in two hours is equivalent
to total human energy use in a year.21 While
much of that sunlight becomes heat, solar
energy is also responsible for the energy
embodied in wind, hydro, wave, and biomass,
each with the potential to be harnessed for
human use. Only a small portion of that enor-
mous daily flux of energy will ever be needed
by humanity.With improved technologies,
greater efficiency, and lower costs, renewable
energy could one day replace all the carbon-
based fuels that are so vital to today’s
economy.22 (See Figure 4.)
Several studies have assessed the scale of the
major renewable resources and what their
practical contribution to the energy economy
might one day be.23 (See Table 3.) In the case
of wind power, the Pacific Northwest Labora-
tory found that the land-based wind resources
of the U.S. states of Kansas, North Dakota, and
Texas could meet all of the nation’s electricity
needs, even with large areas excluded for envi-
ronmental reasons.24 The U.S. wind resource
base is not limited to those states, however, and
beyond the land-based resource, offshore wind
offers enormous potential—enough in the case
of northern European countries such as the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom to in
principle provide all of their electricity.25
China’s wind resources alone are sufficient to
provide more electricity than the country cur-
rently consumes.26
Solar energy represents an even larger
resource. A study by the National Renewable
Energy Laboratory in the United States identi-
fied 159,000 square kilometers of land in seven
southwest states that are suitable for CSP
plants—representing nearly 7,000 GW of gen-
erating capacity, or nearly seven times the
nation’s existing capacity from all sources.27
One-fifth of U.S. electricity could be produced
on a 1,500 square-kilometer plot of land
slightly larger than the city of Phoenix.28 While
some regions such as northern Europe do not
have sufficient solar resources to meet more
than a fraction of their energy needs, other
areas could become major exporters of solar
energy. North Africa, for example, has a vast
solar resource, and plans are being laid to
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Figure 4. Estimates of Available Energy Resources Using
Today’s Technology
build solar power plants that would transmit
electricity to Europe.29 An area covering less
than 4 percent of the Sahara Desert could pro-
duce enough solar power to equal global elec-
tricity demand.30
On average, wind and solar power require
less land to provide a given amount of power
than hydropower or coal do. And sometimes,
renewable energy requires no land at all.
Mounting solar electric generators on just half
of the United States’ suitable rooftop area
could provide 25 percent of the nation’s elec-
tricity, according to one estimate.31 Solar cells
could also be deployed atop outdoor parking
lots, the median strips along highways, and
other currently unused spaces. Renewable
energy also has a big advantage when it comes
to a resource that is more limited than land is:
most forms of renewable energy have minimal
water requirements compared with fossil fuels
and nuclear power, and as water scarcity grows,
the significance of that advantage will increase.
In contrast with fossil fuels, almost every
country has large-scale domestic sources of
renewable energy—including many developing
countries that have no oil resources. Africa,
Australia, China, India, the Middle East, and
the United States all have vast amounts of
solar energy.32 Iceland, Indonesia, and the
Philippines are rich in geothermal energy.33
And scores of countries are rich in biomass
waste materials that flow from their farm and
forest industries.
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Table 3. Estimates of Potential Contribution of Renewable Energy Resources
Energy Source Potential Contribution
Concentrating solar power (CSP) Seven states in the U.S. Southwest could provide more than
7,000 GW of solar generating capacity—nearly seven times U.S.
electric capacity from all sources.
Solar water heaters Could easily provide half the world’s hot water.
Rooftop solar cells Could provide 10 percent of grid electricity in the United States
by 2030.
Wind power Could easily provide 20 percent of world’s electricity; offshore
wind farms could meet all of the European Union’s electricity
needs.
Geothermal heat Could provide 100 GW of generating capacity in the United
States alone.
Wave and ocean thermal energy Contribution could be on same order of magnitude as current
world energy use.
Source: See Endnote 23 for this section.
Designing a
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or all of their abundance, integrating
renewable energy resources into an
energy system that was designed
around fossil fuels presents challenges.
Fossil fuels have the advantage of being con-
centrated and easily stored, and the energy
industry has spent decades building up an
energy delivery system—including massive
pipelines, high-voltage transmission systems,
and local distribution networks—that is
matched to those fuels. Renewable energy
sources are more dispersed, many are available
only part of the time, and the best resources
are often a long distance from where energy is
consumed. These characteristics have not been
a significant impediment to providing as much
as a fifth of the power from wind in some areas
of Europe, but in order to de-carbonize the
energy economy, additional innovation will
be needed.
Electricity is the single most important ele-
ment of today’s energy system, essential for
lighting, cooling, electronics, and many indus-
trial processes. Its role will only grow as air
conditioning and electronics proliferate and as
new technologies allow electricity to be used to
power motor vehicles and to heat and cool
homes efficiently using ground-source heat
pumps. Electricity also happens to be the out-
put of the largest and most easily replaced con-
tributor to carbon dioxide emissions:
coal-fired power plants. It is therefore fortu-
itous that solar, wind, geothermal, and biomass
are all able to produce electricity.
From the generator’s viewpoint, the main
disadvantage of most of these electricity
sources is their variability—wind and solar, for
example, produce on average only 25–40 per-
cent of their rated capacity, depending on the
technology and site.1 Variability turns out,
however, to be not as big a problem for renew-
able electricity as utility engineers once antici-
pated. Power companies are already
accustomed to dealing with fluctuating
demand, and even the supply of electricity
varies when conventional power plants are
shut down unexpectedly. So variability is not a
new concept, though dealing with it does take
planning and a willingness to strengthen weak
electricity grids and to make adjustments in
grid operation as penetration levels rise.
As reliance on coal is reduced in the decades
ahead, it is likely that many regions will need
to move well beyond the 20-percent threshold
for wind, solar, and other variable power
sources. To do this, they can pursue some com-
bination of four strategies: 1) add local gener-
ating capacity using combined heat and
power (CHP) systems, including advanced
technologies such as microturbines and fuel
cells that can be turned on and off as needed;
2) integrate variable sources with digital smart
grids that are more flexible in their ability to
balance demand and supply; 3) develop the
capacity to store energy economically so that
it is available when needed—with options
such as pumped hydro, compressed air, and
advanced chemical batteries and fuel cells;
and 4) selectively add a new generation of effi-
cient, low-cost gas turbines to provide spare
backup power.
Power companies in some regions have
already gained experience in operating grids
that obtain a sizable share of their electricity
from wind energy. Denmark generates about
20 percent of its electricity with the wind, and
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occasionally wind energy meets more than 100
percent of peak demand on the country’s west
coast.2 Four German states produced more
than 30 percent of their electricity with wind
power in 2007.3 And in the U.S. state of Cali-
fornia, renewables make up more than 30 per-
cent of the portfolios of some large utilities.4
Utilities in these regions have balanced supply
and demand through interconnection of grid
systems over large regions, using hydro reser-
voirs as temporary storage, increasing the use
of gas turbines to meet peak demand.5
These tools help utilities regulate the elec-
tricity supply, but there is more they can do on
the demand side as well. New technologies
have made it possible to predict and even con-
trol the level of power demand, saving money
for consumers while better matching supply
and demand.6 But unleashing the full potential
of efficiency and renewable energy will require
upgrading the early 20th century electricity
grids that provide no feedback between con-
sumer and producer and require a physical
visit just to read the meter. Kurt Yeager, who
directs the Galvin Electricity Initiative, an
effort dedicated to promoting digital grids,
compares today’s electromechanical power
grids to a railroad on which it takes 10 days to
open or close a switch.7 New digital grids
include electronic controls that smoothly inte-
grate electricity consumers with all types of
power plants—large, small, and variable—and
with electricity storage facilities.
Digital grids allow the electricity system to
operate much the way the Internet does—as an
electronically controlled network that responds
instantly to decisions made by users, providing
the same kind of efficiency, interconnectivity,
and precision as the digital devices that it pow-
ers. One advantage of such a system is that the
electricity meter can be transformed into a
consumer gateway that transmits price signals
instantaneously and allows unneeded devices
to be turned off when prices are high or
renewable resources are not available. Con-
sumers can monitor their power use with elec-
tronic meters and choose to have their
appliances turned off at times of day when
prices are high.
The Pacific Gas and Electric utility in Cali-
fornia is in the process of installing 9 million
smart meters for its customers, while Europe is
projected to have 80 million smart meters
installed by 2013.8 When starting from scratch,
smart grids are cheaper than conventional sys-
tems, and they are already being deployed in
regions of sub-Saharan Africa that are being
electrified for the first time.9 And digital grids
will allow higher levels of reliance on variable
generators.10
Some utilities are already making the transi-
tion to greater reliance on renewable energy.
Danish power company DONG, which has
hundreds of wind turbines connected to its
system, is making conventional power plants
more flexible so they can be turned down, or
even off, when the wind is blowing. “In the old
times,” explains Chief Executive Anders
Eldrup, “wind power was just something we
layered on top of our regular production. In
the future, wind will provide a big chunk of
our baseload production.”11
In order to qualify for capacity credits
earned when power is generated during peak
periods, some wind farm operators have begun
exploring the use of compressed air storage in
underground steel pipes or geological forma-
tions. One company plans to mount a com-
pressor under the structure that houses the
generating components, and to send the com-
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pressed air down the tower, where it will be
stored underground.12 When electricity is
needed, the compressor is reversed, generating
electricity. TXU, a large electric power com-
pany in Texas, recently canceled eight coal-
fired power plants and is planning instead to
build a 3,000 megawatt wind farm—larger
than any now in operation—that may include
compressed air storage.13
The development of less-expensive, longer-
lived batteries will further ease the way to
greater reliance on renewable energy. Portable
electronic devices and hybrid electric cars are
rapidly increasing demand for advanced batter-
ies made of nickel metal hydride and lithium.
As they become less expensive and more widely
used, these will allow power companies and
consumers to complement distributed micro-
solar generation with distributed storage.
Electricity grids can be made even more
robust and reliable by adding more micro-
power generators that are connected to the
local grid and reduce dependence on distant
power plants. Small-scale gas turbines, Stirling
engines, and fuel cells can provide large
amounts of electricity, with the waste heat
available for use in the buildings in which they
are located.14 And unlike the large power
plants that dominate today’s power system,
micro-generators will be able to respond
quickly to shifts in demand.
Tapping the full potential of renewable
energy will also require expanding the high-
voltage transmission system in many parts of
the world. This is particularly true in sun-rich
North Africa, which is not far from Europe in
distance but currently lacks sufficient electrical
connections. In the United States, electric utili-
ties have underinvested in transmission for
decades, and the existing grid is not well
matched to the onshore renewable resource
base, which lies mainly in the Great Plains and
Desert Southwest, distant from the nation’s
population and industrial centers. Plans have
been laid to build a new National Electrical
Superhighway using high-voltage, direct cur-
rent lines costing $100 billion or more.15 The
concept is being promoted by everyone from
former vice president Al Gore to energy tycoon
T. Boone Pickens, but will require national leg-
w w w . w o r l d w a t c h . o r g L O W - C A R B O N E N E R G Y : A R O A D M A P 25
Designing a New Energy System
Solar energy tow-
ers in Seville, Spain.
© Abengoa Solar
islation to cut through the thicket of federal
and state jurisdictions now in place.16
Over time, stronger, smarter grids and a
new wave of generators will gradually reduce
the need for the baseload coal and nuclear
plants that typically provide one-third to one-
half or more of the generating capacity on
today’s power systems.17 The Combined Power
Plant, a project that links 36 wind, solar, bio-
mass, and hydropower installations through-
out Germany, has already demonstrated that a
combination of renewable sources and more-
effective control can balance out short-term
fluctuations and provide reliable electricity
without any traditional baseload power
plants.18 In a recent interview, S. David Free-
man, former general manager of the Los Ange-
les Department of Water and Power, said, “I’m
a utility executive that ran major utilities, and
I can tell you there is no reason why the elec-
tric-power industry can’t be all renewable.”19
A report by the German Aerospace Center
(DLR) concluded that renewable energy
sources could generate at least 40 percent of
the electricity in most of the world’s 20 largest
economies by 2030.20
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) pro-
duced a detailed study in 2008 showing that
wind power alone could supply 20 percent of
U.S. electricity by 2030.21 The DOE scenario
relies on 305 gigawatts (GW) of wind farms—
up from roughly 25 GW at the end of 2008—
that would be spread widely across the
country, including 54 GW of offshore wind
generators. To make this possible, extensive
new transmission lines will need to be built,
and the industry’s manufacturing capacity will
need to expand, but the DOE analysts con-
cluded that both of those are readily achievable
with sufficient private and public support.
As of late 2008, the U.S. wind industry was
well ahead of the DOE study’s projected devel-
opment pace, and will only need to double the
current rate of annual installations to reach the
16 GW that would need to be added in 2022
under the DOE scenario.22 The benefits of
achieving this goal would include 250,000 new
jobs and reducing CO2 emissions by 825 mil-
lion tons in 2030—virtually stopping the
growth in emissions from the power sector.23
To illustrate what a low-carbon power sys-
tem might look like, we have sketched out a
scenario for the United States in 2030.24 (See
Figure 5.) We assume that improved energy
efficiency will cut the rate of electricity demand
growth to 0.5 percent per year, compared with
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the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s
(EIA's) forecast of a 1 percent growth rate, and
actual growth in the 1990s of 2.4 percent per
year. However, we also assume that by 2030,
half of the energy needs of cars and light trucks
will be met by the grid, increasing the demand
for power by 10 percent. Based on technologies
that are already available or soon will be, our
scenario includes a diverse mix of solar, bio-
mass, geothermal, wind energy, and cogenera-
tion (small, efficient generators located in
industries and buildings), with hydropower
and nuclear retaining a modest role. The EIA,
on the other hand, projects that coal will still
provide over half the country’s electricity in
2030—causing CO2 emissions from the power
sector to continue rising.25
In the Worldwatch scenario, emissions from
the U.S. power sector would be 90 percent
lower than they are today. Notably, no single
renewable resource would need to provide
more than 20 percent of the country’s electric-
ity. A stronger grid, extensive cogeneration,
and modest storage would allow such a system
to operate reliably with only a fraction of the
inflexible baseload plants that dominate
today’s power industry. And if this scenario is
feasible for the United States—which has the
world’s largest electricity system—then some-
thing similar is possible in most countries,
with some achieving a low-carbon power sys-
tem somewhat earlier and others a bit later.
Low-carbon electricity is central to a low-
carbon energy economy, but by itself, it is not
enough. Reducing motor vehicles’ heavy
dependence on oil is another key step, and the
most promising near-term strategy is shifting
to a new generation of electric and hybrid
vehicles. Because of the efficiency of electric
motors, it is estimated that half of motor vehi-
cle energy needs in 2030 could be met with just
a 10-percent increase in the power supply.26
Electricity planners believe that plug-in vehi-
cles would also increase the stability of the
grid: they could be recharged during off-peak
periods and produce power for the grid at
times when demand is high and other
resources are not available—replacing some of
the expensive natural gas-fired “peaking
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Coal 50%
Nuclear 20%
Natural gas 17%
Hydro 6%
Cogeneration 4%
Other renewables 2%
Oil 1%
2007
2030
(Worldwatch Scenario)
2030
(EIA Scenario)
Cogeneration 32%
Wind 20% Solar PV 12%
Solar CSP 10%
Hydro 7%
Nuclear 7%
Biomass 7%
Geothermal 5%
Coal 56%
Nuclear 19%
Natural
gas 19%
Hydro 6%
Other renewables 5%
Cogeneration 3%
Oil 1%
Total = 4,013 TWh
Total = 4,951 TWh
Total = 4,923 TWh
Source: EIA, Worldwatch
Note: “Other renewables” includes wind, biomass,
geothermal, municipal solid waste, solar CSP, and solar.
Figure 5. U.S. Electricity Generation by
Source, 2007 and Two Scenarios for
2030
plants” that utilities now have to rely on. A
smart grid would, of course, be needed for this
to work most efficiently. The timetable for this
transition has accelerated dramatically in the
past few years as General Motors, Nissan, and
Toyota have all announced plans to quickly
bring plug-in cars to the market.27
Natural gas will also play an important role
in the transition to low-carbon energy. Natural
gas produces half the carbon dioxide per unit
of energy that coal does, and because it can be
used far more efficiently, natural gas permits as
much as a 75 percent reduction in CO2 emis-
sions compared with coal. Ironically, then, the
road to low-carbon energy actually involves
increased use of natural gas over the next few
decades—providing a less carbon-intensive
transition fuel in applications where affordable
renewable alternatives are not yet available.
Natural gas resources have not been as heavily
depleted as oil has, and analysts believe that
substantial production increases are possible in
the coming decades.28 In the United States,
which has moved much further down the
depletion curve, production is now increasing
sharply as the industry uses new technology to
exploit extensive gas reserves found in shale
rock in several parts of the country.
Natural gas should be viewed as a premium
fuel with an economic value that matches or
exceeds oil and with an environmental profile
that gives it a solid advantage over other fossil
fuels. But much of the natural gas used today is
effectively wasted—burned to produce low-
temperature heat to warm buildings and heat
water, or consumed in an inefficient single-
cycle power plant. In order to reduce CO2
emissions, both of those applications can be
reduced substantially—as buildings are made
more efficient; as solar energy, ground-source
heat pumps, and biomass provide much of
the energy for space and water heating; and as
the least efficient natural gas-fired power
plants are closed. This would free up large
amounts of natural gas to fuel a new genera-
tion of high-efficiency CHP plants, particularly
the distributed micro-power systems that
could become ubiquitous in commercial and
residential buildings.
The ability to integrate new low-carbon
energy sources into the existing energy infra-
structure will speed the transition and reduce
its cost. Already, wind power is being blended
into many electric grids, while in the transport
sector, ethanol is being added to gasoline in
many countries. Brazil has made a particularly
significant step toward flexibility by widely
adopting cars that can be run on any mixture
of ethanol and gasoline; drivers can make
instant purchasing decisions based on the rela-
tive prices of the two fuels.29 And natural gas
can be gradually supplemented with methane
biogas collected from landfills, livestock feed-
lots, and sewage treatment plants, which would
have otherwise been released into the atmos-
phere. In Germany, methane biogas is already
being added to the country’s natural gas
pipelines.30
In the longer run, the natural gas that cur-
rently courses through the world’s gas
pipelines may be replaced by hydrogen that is
produced from a broad range of renewable
resources—some of it coming from wind and
solar electricity produced in off-peak hours.
During the transition, hydrogen can be mixed
with natural gas—a blend known as hythane—
in the world’s gas pipelines.31
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Jumpstarting a Revolution
f a low-carbon energy economy is possi-
ble, the next question is how we get there
from here. The road ahead will be long
and expensive, but it has become a bit
clearer thanks to the trailblazing initiatives of
pioneering governments and companies over
the past few years. A successful transition will
nonetheless require a powerful combination
of government policy changes, steady techno-
logical progress, and the rechanneling of pri-
vate investment.
It is instructive to remember that when oil
was first discovered in western Pennsylvania in
the 1860s, it was virtually useless—far more
expensive than coal and, prior to the develop-
ment of the refinery or internal combustion
engine, useless for transportation. Even as
crude oil became widely used for lighting in the
late 19th century, the idea that it would become
a dominant energy source—let alone reshape
the global economy—was inconceivable.
In 1907, only 8 percent of U.S. homes had
electricity, Henry Ford had produced about
3,000 vehicles in his four-year-old factory, and
the mass-produced Model T wasn’t yet intro-
duced.1 Similarly, when Thomas Edison intro-
duced his improved lightbulb, skeptics
dismissed it: “Everyone acquainted with the
subject will recognize it as a conspicuous fail-
ure,” said the president of the Stevens
Institute.2 Few would have imagined that by
the mid-20th century, virtually every American
home—and billions of others around the
world—would have electricity and lighting,
and that the automobile would redefine
lifestyles and the economy.
Most economic transitions begin as almost
imperceptible ripples that build into transfor-
mative waves. Dominant technologies and
businesses are protected by a network of insti-
tutional and political support that effectively
resists change. As a result, developers of new
technologies and businesses must start by find-
ing a niche market to exploit, meeting special-
ized needs at a higher cost. But over time, the
new competitor becomes more economical
and widens its share of the market, eventually
undercutting the cost of the dominant player
and gradually remolding the institutional
infrastructure to meet its own needs. The
transition from one generation of technology
to another speeds up as the economic advan-
tage flips.
According to conventional wisdom, the
energy sector is far from such a transforma-
tion. New renewable energy sources, including
solar, wind, geothermal, and biomass, repre-
sent less than 4 percent of the total energy
supply, and in 2008 total U.S. government sup-
port of renewable energy research and devel-
opment (R&D) came to little more than $650
million—about the amount the government
spent in Iraq in a single day.3 What these fig-
ures fail to capture is the recent infusion of
private-sector capital and technology and the
fact that today’s renewable energy pioneers are
not limited to “energy technology” but rather
draw on fields as diverse as semiconductor
physics, biotechnology, aerodynamics, and
computer engineering.
Rapid growth has turned the new energy
industries into lucrative businesses, with
demand outrunning supply and profits soar-
ing. An estimated $71 billion was invested in
new renewable electric and heating capacity in
2007, up from just $20 billion in 2002.4 (See
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Figure 6.) Some of the world’s leading corpo-
rations have made major investments in
renewable energy, including Applied Materials
(solar PV), BP (wind and solar PV), General
Electric (wind), DuPont (biofuels), Goldman
Sachs (wind and concentrating solar), Mit-
subishi (wind), Royal Dutch Shell (wind,
hydrogen, and solar PV), Sharp (solar PV), and
Siemens (wind).5
Corporate R&D on clean energy technolo-
gies reached $9.8 billion in 2007.6 This is 15
times U.S. government spending on renewable
energy R&D in 2008.7 A single company,
Vestas Wind Systems, spent $169 million on
R&D in 2007, while the U.S. government spent
just over $50 million on wind R&D.8 Even
these comparisons understate private R&D,
which is often embedded in commercial proj-
ects, and they exclude R&D investments by
privately held companies, many of them
funded with venture capital and other forms
of equity investment. Venture capital and pri-
vate equity investment in clean energy totaled
$13.2 billion in 2007, 42 percent above the
2006 level and 13 times the 2001 level.9 By
early 2007, these investments had helped create
253 clean energy start-up companies with
names such as Nanosolar, Celunol, SunPower,
E3 Biofuels, and Miasole, most of them work-
ing to develop and commercialize new energy
technologies.10
These tiny firms may be the real game
changers, following in the footsteps of compa-
nies like Microsoft and Google, which quickly
came to dominate their more established com-
petitors, bringing a level of innovation that
larger firms are rarely capable of. In Silicon
Valley, clean energy has become the hottest
new sector for entrepreneurs and investors.
Venture capitalists typically make money by
investing in technologies with small market
shares but high growth potential. They like the
energy sector because of its vast size—far
larger than the I.T. sector—and the fact that
there is a huge gap between the sluggish ways
of the incumbent energy companies and the
game-changing innovations being pursued by
hundreds of upstart challengers.11 Although it
is regrettable that serious investment in renew-
able energy did not begin earlier, the science
and technology available today will allow the
industry to achieve performance and cost goals
that would not have been possible in the past.
The best example is solar photovoltaics,
where producers are pursuing a host of strate-
gies for reducing materials requirements, rais-
ing efficiency, and lowering manufacturing
costs of the crystalline cells that dominate the
market. Other companies are developing new
thin-film photovoltaic materials that hold the
promise of dramatic cost reductions.With
demand outrunning supplies of PV materials
in the past few years, price trends temporarily
reversed their usual downward course.12 But
the industry is planning to increase its manu-
facturing capacity as much as eightfold over
the next three years, and dramatic price
declines are expected, spurring the industry to
develop new applications and markets that
would not be feasible today.13
Beyond the advance in technology, the eco-
nomics of renewable energy will further
improve as the scale of production grows—the
same phenomenon that has successively turned
televisions, personal computers, and mobile
phones from specialty products for high-
income technology pioneers into mass-market
consumer devices. An analysis of production
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Figure 6. Annual Investment in New Renewable Energy
Capacity, 1995–2007
costs in several manufacturing industries by
the Boston Consulting Group found that each
time cumulative production of a manufactured
device doubles, production costs fall by 20–30
percent.14 This is good news for clean energy
industries: the manufacture of wind turbines
has doubled in just the past three years, while
the manufacture of solar cells has doubled in
the last two.15
The combination of falling technology costs
and rising fossil fuel prices has taken renewable
energy to the threshold of economic competi-
tiveness. Wind power is already less expensive
than natural gas-fired power in the United
States and nearly even with coal—even with-
out accounting for the cost of CO2 emissions.16
Solar power is on track to be economical both
in wholesale grid and local retail markets
within the next five years.17 As these thresholds
are crossed, they will fuel additional growth,
expanding markets, reducing the need for gov-
ernment subsidies, and driving additional
technology development and job creation.
Advancing technology and rising energy
prices have created an extraordinarily favorable
market for new energy systems. But reaching a
true economic tipping point will require new
public policies and strong political leadership.
Energy markets virtually everywhere are regu-
lated, heavily subsidized, inefficient, and rarely
predictable.What happens to the energy econ-
omy, and to the world’s climate, in the years
ahead will be heavily influenced by hundreds
of policy decisions made at international,
national, and local levels—and whether these
new policies can be sustained.
Many energy economists argue that the rea-
son fossil fuels dominate today is their inher-
ently lower cost compared with the
alternatives. This suggests that internalizing
environmental costs by putting a price on car-
bon—likely through a carbon dioxide tax or a
regulatory cap on emissions such as the one in
Europe—would solve the climate problem.
Getting the price signals right is an essential
step, but its limits are demonstrated by the
modest impact that the increase in average oil
prices from $30 in 2003 to nearly $100 in 2008
has had on petroleum consumption.18 That
increase is equivalent to a CO2 price of $170
per ton; by comparison, the October 2008
price of an emission allowance in Europe was €
€23.5 ($32) per ton.19 This suggests that any
carbon pricing system likely to be politically
feasible in the next decade or so would have a
relatively minor impact on energy investment
decisions. To be effective, climate policy will
need to address not just the price of emissions
but the failures of energy markets that limit the
ability of prices to send a clear signal.
The neoclassical economic model assumes
an economically frictionless world in which
buyers and sellers have all the information and
capital they need, and there are no serious bar-
riers to the introduction of new technologies.
Economic research beginning in the 1920s has
shown that the costs of transactions can greatly
limit the effectiveness of markets, while other
research suggests that economic behavior often
fails to follow neoclassical rules. Nobel laureate
economist Douglass North has shown that
laws, customs, and social priorities greatly
influence the working of the economy.20 With-
out them, most markets would work ineffi-
ciently if at all.
Because energy markets have been shaped
more than most others by government policy,
institutional constraints, and the power of
large industrial enterprises, simple economic
theory provides minimal insight about how to
spur change. The electric power industry is
particularly far from the neoclassical model,
governed as it is by extensive government regu-
lation that is intended to facilitate develop-
ment of large, reliable electric systems, with
one company dominating most local grids and
in some cases owning the transmission lines
and power plants as well. Although this eco-
nomic model has been broadly successful in
delivering affordable electricity to billions of
people, it has done so mainly by making it easy
to add energy supply—but providing much
less incentive or opportunity to improve
energy efficiency. Regulations have also favored
large fuel-intensive generators at the expense
of smaller, capital-intensive units. The result is
an electricity system that is far from the eco-
nomic ideal—and one that will require major
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reforms if it is to maximize economic effi-
ciency, let alone account for the massive envi-
ronmental externalities represented by global
climate change.
In a traditionally regulated system, where a
utility produces and distributes electricity at a
fixed rate of return, profits are determined in
part by the amount of power sold. This natu-
rally makes such utilities proponents of
demand growth—the more electricity con-
sumers buy, the more profitable the utility is.
And as long as the regulator approves, there is
no risk in building a power plant since there
are no competitors, and costs are borne by the
consumer. The utility also bears little risk if the
plant burns a fuel whose price is volatile—fuel
adjustment clauses allow price increases also to
be passed to the customer. Although con-
sumers should in theory be interested in mak-
ing investments in energy efficiency whenever
it is economical, they face many obstacles,
including a lack of capital to invest in conser-
vation and a lack of information about which
investments make sense. Perceiving the lack of
demand, potential manufacturers and
installers of energy-efficient equipment have
little incentive to scale up production or build
businesses that would facilitate efficiency
improvements.
One of the easiest ways to overcome these
kinds of market barriers is via simple govern-
ment mandates. Since the 1970s, many govern-
ments have required that home appliances,
motor vehicles, and buildings meet minimum
efficiency standards in order to be sold, and
these standards have been gradually ratcheted
up over time. Additional tightening is now in
order, and governments are moving quickly in
that direction. Average auto efficiency stan-
dards, for example, have recently been
increased to 47 miles per gallon in Japan and
49 mpg in Europe.21 Meanwhile, the U.S. Con-
gress tightened its standard to 35.7 miles per
gallon by 2015, up from the 27.5 mpg standard
that has been in place for the past two
decades.22
Another approach to requiring efficiency
can be seen in the law passed in Australia in
2007 to phase out the use of most incandescent
light bulbs, which would be replaced by com-
pact fluorescent bulbs that are four times as
efficient.23 Since then, several other countries
have also committed to phasing out incandes-
cent bulbs.24
Government mandates are also being used
to compel the construction of more energy-
efficient buildings and to require the introduc-
tion of renewable energy into electricity grids
as well as the markets for liquid fuels. Several
national governments and 26 states in the
United States now have binding “renewable
portfolio standards” requiring that specified
amounts of renewable electricity be added to
their grids.25 In Spain, a 2006 update of build-
ing codes requires all new buildings to incor-
porate solar water heaters.26 As of April 2008,
the state government of Baden-Wurttemberg,
Germany, requires that 20 percent of new
buildings’ heating requirements be met with
renewable energy.27 And Brazil, the United
States, and the European Union are among the
jurisdictions that require that a minimum pro-
portion of biofuels be blended with gasoline
and diesel fuel, spurring growth in their use.28
Such mandates are essential for patching
some of the holes in a market economy, but
they are at best blunt instruments that cannot
by themselves harness the full power of the
market to effect change.While they ensure that
minimum standards are met, they give no
incentive for achieving the best possible effi-
ciencies and the lowest possible emissions. One
way to provide that kind of incentive is to de-
couple electric utilities’ profits from the
amount of power they sell by introducing a
regulatory formula that instead rewards utili-
ties for providing the best service at the least
cost. California regulators have already made
this change; as a result of this and other poli-
cies, Californians use less than half as much
electricity per person as other Americans do.29
(See Figure 7.)
Spurred by the recent rise in fuel costs—and
consequently in power prices—electric utilities
have taken a fresh look at energy efficiency as a
strategic investment, something that was last in
favor in the 1980s. This time, the utilities and
their regulators are working together, looking
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for ways to align the utilities’ profit motives
with what is needed to reduce customers’
power bills and reduce power plant emissions.
Duke Energy has estimated that utility effi-
ciency programs will be 10 percent less expen-
sive than any new source of supply, and has
requested that the North Carolina Utility
Commission allow it to earn a return on 90
percent of the costs avoided via its efficiency
investments.30 The California Public Utilities
Commission has made similar recent adjust-
ments, and Pacific Gas and Electric plans to
invest $1 billion in improved energy
efficiency.31
John Hoffman, an energy efficiency expert
and former U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency official, has proposed an additional
strategy for spurring efficiency investments: a
“transaction bridge” that allows manufacturers
and installers to share in the savings derived
from installing more-efficient equipment in
buildings.32 This would motivate them to con-
tinually develop better technologies, to work
with utilities to accelerate the development of
new markets, and to scale up both production
and installation in order to lower cost. This
mechanism could also be used to spur intro-
duction of micro-power technologies such as
photovoltaics, as well as ground-source heat
pumps. And Hoffman has proposed a similar
system for motivating the production and sales
of efficient vehicles.
European governments have developed
another economic tool to spur investment in
renewable energy. In 1979, the Danish govern-
ment ordered utilities to give small wind tur-
bines access to the electric grid and to pay a
higher price for the renewable electricity they
purchased. This law and successive regulations
that established set purchase prices for renew-
able power stopped utilities from thwarting
potential competitors, and over two decades
they reduced Denmark’s dependence on fossil
fuels and made the country a leading generator
of wind and biopower.33
Germany and Spain adopted similar mar-
ket-access laws (called feed-in tariffs, or renew-
able energy payments) in the 1990s, and they
too moved quickly into the leading ranks of
renewable energy development.34 Over time,
the prices governments set have been adjusted
downward as the cost of renewable technolo-
gies has fallen. As a result of this law, Germany,
which by international standards has a
mediocre endowment of renewable resources,
has increased the renewable share of its elec-
tricity supply from just under 5 percent in 1998
to over 14 percent today.35 This reduced CO2
emissions from the nation’s power sector by 79
million tons in 2007—enough to cut emissions
from the power sector by 18 percent and total
national emissions by nearly 10 percent.36
Other countries with a larger renewable
resource base are entering the market at a time
when renewable energy technologies are more
mature. They should, with the right policies, be
able to move even faster. China’s renewable
energy markets have grown far more rapidly in
the past few years than European markets did
at their peak growth rates in the 1990s. In the
United States, the market for wind turbines has
tripled in the past three years, and the market
for solar power is right behind.37
The economic opportunities presented by
the booming market for new energy technolo-
gies have dramatically increased political sup-
port for these alternatives, which in turn is
driving further growth. This dynamic can be
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of United States, 1960–2007
seen clearly in the United States, where gover-
nors in states such as Iowa, Michigan, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania are working to revive their
economies by attracting the solar, wind, bioen-
ergy, and electric car industries. By 2006, the
U.S. renewables industry had created 386,000
jobs, compared with 82,000 jobs in the coal
industry.38 Worldwide, the renewables indus-
tries had created 2.3 million jobs by 2006.39
(See Table 4.)
Growing political support for green energy
provides further evidence that the world may
be on the verge of a major transformation of
energy markets. The powerful interaction of
advancing technology, private investment, and
policy reform has led to a pace of change
unseen since men like Thomas Edison and
Henry Ford created the last great energy revo-
lution a century ago. But is it enough? Will the
coming years bring the accelerated change and
trillions of dollars of investment that Nicholas
Stern, the International Energy Agency, and
others estimate is needed to reverse the tide of
climate change?40
The answer to that question will likely be
found not in the messy world of economics
but in the even messier world of politics. Can
the enormous power of today’s industries be
set aside in favor of the common good? As
negotiations continue on the international cli-
mate agreement that will follow the first com-
mitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, which
ends in 2012, the world’s political will to tackle
climate change will be put to an early test. The
politics of climate change are advancing more
rapidly than could have been imagined a few
years ago. But time is growing short.
The world has not yet reached the political
tipping point that would ensure the kind of
economic transformation that is required. But
there are growing indications that it is near. In
the summer of 2008, T. Boone Pickens, a
prominent Texas oil tycoon, proposed deploy-
ing massive wind farms in the Great Plains to
provide at least a fifth of U.S. electricity.41 A
couple of weeks later, former vice president Al
Gore proposed shutting down all uncontrolled
U.S. coal-fired power plants within a decade
and replacing them mainly with renewables.42
Then, in early October, Google proposed end-
ing coal-fired generation in the United States
by 2030, spending $4 trillion to replace it with
efficiency and renewables, with the goal of
making renewables cheaper than coal.43 In a
speech announcing the plan, Google CEO Eric
Schmidt said, “I’m a computer scientist, and
computer scientists love scale problems.”44
A week later, the International Energy
Agency, which has for decades dismissed
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Table 4. Estimated Employment in the Renewable Energy Sector,
2006
Renewable Energy Source World* Selected Countries
Biomass 1,174,000 Brazil 500,000
United States 312,200
China 266,000
Germany 95,400
Spain 10,349
Solar Thermal 624,000-plus China 600,000
Germany 13,300
Spain 9,142
United States 1,900
Wind 300,000 Germany 82,100
United States 36,800
Spain 35,000
China 22,200
Denmark 21,000
India 10,000
Solar PV 170,000** China 55,000
Germany 35,000
Spain 26,449
United States 15,700
Hydropower 39,000-plus Europe 20,000
United States 19,000
Geothermal 25,000 United States 21,000
Germany 4,200
*Countries for which information is available.
**Under the assumption that Japan’s PV industry employs roughly as many people as
Germany’s PV industry.
Source: See Endnote 39 for this section.
renewables as niche sources of energy, called
for these sources to supply half of global elec-
tricity by 2050. “Governments need to do
more,” said Executive Director Nobuo Tanaka.
“Setting a carbon price is not enough. To foster
a smooth and efficient transition of renewables
towards mass market integration, renewable
energy policies should be designed around a
set of fundamental principles, inserted into
predictable, transparent, and stable policy
frameworks [in order to] make the energy
technology revolution happen.”45
The biggest question for the world’s climate
is whether the energy revolution in industrial
nations will take hold in developing countries
as well. China has already passed the United
States in annual CO2 emissions, and the devel-
oping world as a whole is on course to produce
the majority of global emissions within the
next decade. Conventional wisdom holds that
developing countries are too poor and lack the
technical sophistication to adopt state-of-the-
art energy systems.While superficially con-
vincing, this argument misses the fact that
although the new energy systems are differ-
ent—and will require adaptation by both gov-
ernments and the private sector—they are in
the end better matched to the indigenous
resources and capabilities that most developing
countries possess. Renewable technologies and
efficiency will allow developing countries to
increase their reliance on indigenous resources
and reduce their dependence on expensive and
unstable imported fuels. Around the world,
new energy systems could become a huge
engine of economic development and job cre-
ation, opening vast economic opportunities for
developing countries. And the total cost in the
long term will likely be less than following the
current, carbon-laden path.
China is beginning to show the way for-
ward. Even as it continues to build coal-fired
power plants at the fastest pace in human his-
tory—roughly two per week—the country has
suddenly emerged as a clean energy leader.46
New laws enacted since 2004 have jumpstarted
the energy-efficiency and renewable energy
industries in China, in some cases creating new
industries from scratch. China now leads the
world in solar water heating, small hydro-
power, and the manufacture of efficient CFL
light bulbs.47 It was among the top producers
of solar cells and the third largest installer of
wind turbines in 2007, and is on track to lead
both sectors by 2010.48 China is meanwhile
making great strides in its efforts to be a leader
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World's largest solar
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Desert.
NREL
in green buildings and green cars—persuading
U.S. billionaire Warren Buffett in 2008 to
invest $230 million in BYD, a Chinese battery
manufacturer that plans to mass market a
hybrid electric car.49
Other developing countries lack many of
the extraordinary capabilities that China has
demonstrated. But if China shifts away from
its coal-based energy path to one that favors
efficiency and renewables, it will have an enor-
mous impact on the global economy, and
will inevitably pull other countries into its
orbit. Developing countries that pay little
attention to what happens in Europe or the
United States may be more influenced by the
policy choices made in Beijing. And the dra-
matic cost reductions in renewable energy
technologies that China is likely to spur will
make it much easier for developing nations to
adopt those technologies.
Tipping points are easier to decipher in ret-
rospect than in advance. No one can say for sure
whether the substantial shifts in energy markets
and energy policies over the past few years are
the precursors to a revolution. Just as the events
of the past few years have surprised us, so will
those ahead. And the financial crisis now break-
ing over the global economy will likely have
profound impacts on energy markets.
Even with those substantial caveats, the evi-
dence presented in this report suggests that
when historians look back on 2008, they will
conclude that a 21st-century energy revolution
was well under way.Whether they will also be
able to say that the world was able to avert cat-
astrophic climate change will be determined by
the decisions we make in the decade ahead.
Urgency and vision are the twin pillars on
which humanity’s hope now hangs.
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